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Abstract
This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently
proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to innitely-lived societies.
First, some novel characterisations of inegalitarian leximax social welfare re-
lations are derived based on the Individual Benet Principle (IBP), which
incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society. This is surprising
because the IBP has no obvious inegalitarian content. Second, some im-
possibility results are derived that highlight a general tension between stan-
dard fairness and e¢ ciency axioms in social choice, and a liberal Principle
of Non-Interference that generalises IBP.
JEL classication: D63; D70.
Key-words: Innite utility streams, Individual Benet Principle, leximax,
Non-Interference, impossibility.
1 Introduction
Liberal principles in philosophy and social choice tend to express some no-
tion of individual autonomy or freedom. In a recent contribution, Mariotti
and Veneziani (2009a) have proposed a new axiom - called the Harm Prin-
ciple (HP) - suited for Social Welfare Orderings (swos), which captures a
liberal view of non-interference inspired by J.S. Mills conception of liberty.
The basic content of HP can be illustrated as follows: consider two welfare
allocations u and v such that u is socially preferred to v, and two di¤erent
allocations u0 and v0 such that agent i is worse o¤ at these than at the
corresponding starting allocations, the other agents are equally well o¤, and
agent i prefers u0 to v0. Whatever the cause of the decrease in agent is wel-
fare, HP requires that societys preferences over u0 and v0 agree with person
is preferences: having already su¤ered a welfare loss in both allocations,
and given that nobody else is a¤ected, agent i should not be punished in
the swo by changing social preferences against her.
AlthoughHP incorporates no egalitarian content, Mariotti and Veneziani
(2009a) have shown that, together with the standard axioms of Anonymity
and Strong Pareto, it characterises the leximin swo in societies with a -
nite number of agents. Lombardi and Veneziani (2009) have generalised this
surprising result by weakening HP and, based on the weak HP, they have
provided novel characterisations of various swos related to Rawlss di¤er-
ence principle. They have also used the weakHP to characterise the leximin
social welfare relations (swrs) proposed by Asheim and Tungodden (2004)
and by Bossert et al. (2007) in innitely-lived economies. The latter results
are particularly interesting because the analysis of innitely-lived societies
is crucial, especially in the discussion of intergenerational justice, and the
denition of suitable criteria to evaluate allocations is still an open question
in the innite context (among recent contributions see, for example, Lauw-
ers, 1997; Basu and Mitra, 2003; Zame 2007; Hara et al., 2008; Crespo et
al., 2009; Alcantud and Garcìa-Sanz, 2010; Lauwers, 2010. For a thorough
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review, see Asheim, 2010).
This paper extends the analysis of liberal, non-interfering views in innitely-
lived societies in two main directions. First, the Individual Benet Principle
(IBP) - proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2010) in economies with a
nite number of agents - is analysed. The IBP also incorporates a liberal,
non-interfering view of society and it can be taken as the theoretical com-
plement of HP, for it requires society not to switch its preferences when
agent is welfare in both allocations u and v above increases. It is shown
that a weaker version of IBP suitable for swrs in innitely-lived societies,
together with some standard axioms, characterises various inegalitarian lex-
imax swrs. These results are interesting per se, because the IBP has no
obvious inegalitarian content, and because they provide the rst characteri-
sations of leximax swrs in the innite context. But they also have relevant
implications for liberal approaches to social choice.
In fact, second, as argued by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009b, 2010), HP
and IBP should be seen as two parts of a single liberal principle of Non-
Interference. In nite economies, Mariotti and Veneziani (2010) prove that
any swo that satises the principle of Non-Interference and Weak Pareto
Optimality must be dictatorial. This arguably raises serious questions on lib-
eral, non-interfering approaches in social choice and political philosophy. In
this paper, a weak principle of Non-Interference suited for swrs in innitely-
lived societies is proposed, and two impossibility results are proved which
conrm the existence of a general conict between liberal principles of non-
interference and standard fairness and e¢ ciency axioms. This conict arises
even if no requirements of continuity are imposed and it derives from the
general tension between two conicting swrs that are simultaneously im-
plied by the axioms.
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2 The Framework
Let X  RN be the set of countably innite utility streams, where R is
the set of real numbers and N is the set of natural numbers. An element
of X is 1u = (u1; u2; :::) and ut is the utility of a representative member of
generation t 2 N. For any T 2 N and any 1u 2 X, 1uT = (u1; :::; uT ) denotes
the T -head of 1u and T+1u = (uT+1; uT+2; :::) denotes its T -tail, so that the
stream 1u can be written as 1u = (1uT ; T+1 u).
A permutation  is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permutation
 of N is nite whenever there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, 8t > T . Let  be
the set of all nite permutations. For any 1u 2 X and any permutation , let
 (1u) =
 
u(t)

t2N be a permutation of 1u. For any T 2 N and 1u 2 X, 1uT
is a permutation of 1uT such that the components are ranked in ascending
order.
For any 1u; 1v 2 X, we write 1u  1v to mean ut  vt, 8t 2 N; 1u > 1v
to mean 1u  1v and 1u 6= 1v; and 1u 1v to mean ut > vt, 8t 2 N.
Let < be a binary relation over X. For any 1u; 1v 2 X, we write 1u < 1v
for (1u; 1v) 2< and 1u 6< 1v for (1u; 1v) =2<; < stands for at least as good
as. For any 1u; 1v 2 X, the asymmetric factor  of < is dened by 1u  1v
if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v 6< 1u, and the symmetric part s of < is dened
by 1u s 1v if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v < 1u. Throughout the paper, <
on X is assumed to be reexive and transitive, but not necessarily complete.
Let < and <0 be relations on X, <0 is an extension of < if <<0 and 0.
3 The Harm Principle
A standard denition of the leximin swr used in the literature to compare
countably innite utility streams is due to Asheim and Tungodden (2004;
Denition 2, p. 224). This denition can be stated as follows:
Denition 1. <LM is the leximin swr if, 81u; 1v 2 X:
(i) 1u LM 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ; and,
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(ii) 1u LM 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that, 8T  ~T , 9t 2 f1; :::; Tg with us =
vs (81  s < t) and ut > vt.
The characterisation of the leximin swr<LM by Lombardi and Veneziani
(2009) is based on the following axioms.
Finite Anonymity, FA: 81u 2 X and 8 2 , (1u)  1u.
Strong Pareto Optimality, SPO: 81u; 1v 2 X : 1u > 1v ) 1u  1v.
FA and SPO incorporate standard principles of fairness and e¢ ciency,
respectively, and need no further comment.
Weak Preference Continuity,WPC: 81u; 1v 2 X : 9 ~T  1 such that
(1uT ; T+1 v)  1v 8T  ~T ) 1u  1v.
WPC has been proposed by Asheim and Tungodden (2004): it estab-
lishes a link to the standard nite setting of distributive justice, by trans-
forming the comparison of any two innite utility paths to an innite number
of comparisons of utility paths each containing a nite number of genera-
tions(Asheim and Tungodden, 2004; p. 223).1
Minimal Completeness, MC: 81u; 1v 2 X, 9T  1 (1uT ; T+1 v) 6= 1v
) (1uT ; T+1 v) < 1v or 1v < (1uT ; T+1 v).
MC states that a swr should be able to compare (at least) vectors with
the same tail: this seems an obviously desirable property, as it imposes a
minimum requirement of completeness.
Weak Harm Principle, HP: 81u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X : 9T  1 1u =
(1uT ; T+1v)  1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
1AlthoughWPC may be seen as a purely technical requirement to deal with innite-
dimensional vectors, it does entail a preference for earlier generations, owing to its reliance
on a natural order. As argued below, none of the key insights of this paper depends on a
natural ordering of generations. We thank Geir Asheim for alerting us to this issue.
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u0i < ui;
v0i < vi;
u0j = uj ;8j 6= i;
v0j = vj ;8j 6= i;
implies 1v0  1u0 whenever u0i > v0i.
HP formalises the Harm Principle in innitely-lived societies. It is
weaker than the version analysed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a), be-
cause it does not require that 1u0  1v0 and instead it emphasises the nega-
tive prescription of the Harm Principle by simply ruling out the reversal of
strict preferences. Moreover it only holds for vectors with the same tail.2
Based on these axioms, Lombardi and Veneziani (2009; Theorem 3) prove
the following result.
Theorem 1. < is an extension of <LM if and only if < satises FA, SPO,
HP,WPC, and MC.
As Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) have argued, a characterisation of the
leximin based on HP is surprising, because HP has no obvious egalitarian
content, unlike the standard axiom of Hammond Equity (see, e.g., Ham-
mond, 1976; Asheim and Tungodden, 2004). Equally surprising is that, by
a germane perturbation of HP, it is possible to characterise the strongly
inegalitarian leximax swr.
4 The Benet Principle and Non-Interference
According to the leximax, that society is best which (lexicographically) max-
imises the welfare of its best-o¤members. In innitely-lived economies, this
2The philosophical foundations of HP (and of the principle of Non-Interference intro-
duced below) are extensively analysed in Mariotti and Veneziani (2009b), in relation to
classical liberal political philosophy. For a more detailed discussion of the axioms, see also
Lombardi and Veneziani (2009).
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intuition can be formalised as follows.
Denition 2. <LX is the leximax swr if, 81u;1 v 2 X:
(i) 1u LX 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ; and,
(ii) 1u LX 1v , 9 ~T  1 such that, 8T  ~T , 9t 2 f1; :::; Tg with us =
vs (8t < s  T ) and ut > vt.
In order to characterise the leximax swr, the same axioms as for the
leximin are used, except for HP, which is substituted with the Individual
Benet Principle. The IBP also captures a liberal requirement of non-
interference and can be formalised as follows.
Individual Benefit Principle, IBP: 81u;1 v;1 u0;1 v0 2 X : 9T  1 1u =
(1uT ;T+1 v)  1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
u0i > ui;
v0i > vi;
u0j = uj ;8j 6= i;
v0j = vj ;8j 6= i;
implies 1v0  1u0 whenever u0i > v0i.
IBP stipulates that after an increase in welfare that concerns only agent
i, society should not reverse the strict preference between 1u and 1v to a
strict preference for 1v0 over 1u0, possibly except when i prefers otherwise.
Whatever the cause of the increase in welfare for agent i, society should
not punish i by reversing its strict preferences, given that nobody else is
a¤ected and therefore for all other agents the choice between 1u0 and 1v0 is
the same as between 1u and 1v:
The liberal moral intuition behind IBP is similar to the HP, and yet
Theorem 2 proves that IBP leads to a rather di¤erent result.
Theorem 2. < is an extension of <LX if and only if < satises FA, SPO,
IBP,WPC, and MC.
6
Proof. ()) Let <LX<. It is easy to see that < meets FA, SPO,WPC,
andMC. We show that < satises IBP. Take any 1u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X such
that 1u = (1uT ; T+1 v)  1v 9T  1, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
u0i > ui, v
0
i > vi, u
0
j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i. We show that 1u0  1v0
whenever u0i > v
0
i. As 1u, 1v have the same tail, 1u  LX 1v. Then, 9 ~T  1
such that 8T 0  ~T there is a t 2 f1; :::; T 0g such that us = vs 8t < s  T 0,
and ut > vt. Take any T 0  ~T . If uT 0 > vT 0 , then the result follows since
u0T 0 2 fu0i; uT 0g and v0T 0 2 fv0i; vT 0g. Otherwise, let uT 0 = vT 0 . The result
is readily obtained if vk = v0k 8t  k  T 0. Thus, let vk 6= v0k for some
t  k  T 0. We proceed according to whether vt < v0i < vt+1 or not.
Case 1. vt < v0i < vt+1
Then, v0t+1 > v0t = v0i > vt and v
0
s = vs 8T 0  s > t. If u0i 2 (v0i; ut+1], then
u0t > v0i = v
0
t. Otherwise, let u
0
i > ut+1. Thus, there exists j  t + 1 such
that u0i = u
0
j > uj . Let
m  maxt+ 1  j  T 0ju0j > uj	 .
Since v0j = vj = uj 8t < j  T 0 it follows that u0m > v0m. In either case,
we conclude that there exists t  T 0 such that u0s = v0s 8t < s  T 0 and
u0t > v0t , as sought.
Case 2. v0i  vt+1
If v0i  vT 0 , then u0T 0 > v0T 0 as u0i > v0i. Otherwise, let v0i < vT 0 . Let
`  mint+ 1 < j  T 0jv0i < vj	 .
Then, v` > v0i = v
0
` 1  u` 1 = v` 1. Since v0i < u0i, then u0i > u` 1. If
u0i 2 (u` 1; u`], then v0` 1 < u0i = u0` 1. Otherwise, let u` < u0i. Then, there
exists ` < m  T 0 such that v0m = vm < u0m = u0i. Furthermore, u0s =
v0s 8m < s  T 0 if m < T 0. In either case, we have found a t 2 ft; :::; T 0g
such that u0s = v0s 8t < s  T 0 and u0t > v0t .
Since the above arguments hold for any T 0  ~T , and by our supposition
<LX<, we have that 1u0  1v0, as sought.
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(() Suppose that < satises FA, SPO, IBP, WPC, and MC. We
show that LX and LX. Take any 1u; 1v 2 X.
If 1u LX 1v, then by denition, 9 ~T  1 such that 8T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ,
and so T+1u = T+1v 8T > ~T . By FA it follows that 1u  1v, as sought.
Next, suppose that 1u LX 1v. By denition 9 ~T  1 such that, 8T  ~T ,
9t 2 f1; :::; Tg with us = vs (8t < s  T ) and ut > vt. Take any T  ~T
and consider the vector 1w  (1uT ; T+1 v). Note that 1w LX 1v. By
contradiction, we prove that 1w  1v. By FA and transitivity, we can
consider 1 w  (1uT ; T+1 v) and 1v  (1vT ; T+1 v). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that 1v  1 w.
Then, vl > wl, 9l < t  T , otherwise SPO yields a contradiction. Let
k  maxf1  l < tjvl > wlg:
By FA, let wi = wk and vi = vk+g 9g 2 N such that 0 < g  t   k and
wk+g > vk+g. Let d1; d2 > 0, and consider vectors 1w0; 1v0 formed from
1 w; 1v as follows: vk+g is raised to vk+g + d1 such that wk+g > vk+g + d1;
wk is raised to wk + d2 such that vk+g + d1 > wk + d2 > vk; and all other
entries of 1 w and 1v are unchanged. By FA, consider 1 w0 = (1 w0T ; T+1 v)
and 1v0 = (1v0T ; T+1 v). By construction w
0
j  v0j 8j  k, with w0k+g > v0k+g.
IBP implies 1 w0  1v0, and so 1v0 < 1 w0, byMC. Moreover, by SPO, d1; d2
can be chosen so that 1v0  1 w0, without loss of generality. Consider two
sub-cases:
a) Suppose that vk > wk, but wl  vl 8l < k. It follows that 1 w0 > 1v0, and
so SPO implies that 1 w0  1v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that vl > wl 9l < k. Note that by construction v0l = vl and
w0l = wl 8l < k. Then, let
k0  maxf1  l < kjv0l > w0lg.
The above argument can be applied to 1 w0; 1v0 to derive vectors 1 w00; 1v00
such that w00j  v00j 8j  k0, whereas IBP, combined with MC, FA, and
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SPO imply 1v00  1 w00. And so on. After a nite number of iterations q,
two vectors 1 wq; 1vq can be derived such that, by IBP, combined withMC,
FA, and SPO, 1vq  1 wq but, by SPO, 1 wq  1vq, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that 1v  1 w.
By assumption, vt < ut  wt. Therefore, dene 1 w0 as follows: w0 = w
8 2 Nnftg and w0t = wt    > vt, 9 > 0. By SPO and transitivity, it
follows that 1v  1 w0 but 1 w0 LX 1v. Hence, the argument of Case 1 above
can be applied to 1v and 1 w0, which produces the desired contradiction.
Since 1v 6< 1 w, MC implies 1 w  1v. FA and transitivity imply that
(1uT ; T+1v)  1v. Since this is true for any T  ~T ,WPC implies 1u  1v,
as sought.3
Thus, a seemingly mild liberal principle, together with standard fairness
and e¢ ciency axioms, leads straight to a strongly inegalitarian criterion.
But Theorem 2 has another interesting theoretical implication. Consider
the next axiom, which incorporates the normative intuitions behind HP
and IBP in a unied liberal framework, and generalises the principle of
Non-Interference proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2010) to innitely-
lived economies.
Non-Interference, NI: 81u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X : 9T  1 1u = (1uT ; T+1 v) 
1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T , 
u0i   ui
  
v0i   vi

> 0;
u0j = uj ;8j 6= i;
v0j = vj ;8j 6= i;
implies 1v0  1u0 whenever u0i > v0i.
Axiom NI captures the following liberal intuition: changes in one indi-
viduals welfare that leave all other agents una¤ected should not be a motive
3For the sake of completeness of the proof, the axioms are independent (see the Ad-
dendum).
9
for penalising the individual in the social welfare judgement (by switching
strict preferences against her), whether the change involves a damage or a
benet for her.
Theorems 1 and 2 reveal a fundamental tension between standard axioms
in social choice and liberal principles of non-interference.
Theorem 3. There exists no swr on X that satises FA, SPO, WPC,
MC, and NI.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to the statement, that there is an swr < on X
that satises FA, SPO, WPC, MC, and NI. Let ;  2 R, with  > ,
and consider vectors 1u, 1v 2 X such that ut = , 8t, whereas v1 <  and
vt = , 8t  2. By Theorem 1, 1u  1v, but by Theorem 2, 1v  1u, a
contradiction.
Theorem 3 suggests that a fully non-interfering liberal approach does not
provide adequate foundations for social welfare judgements in innitely-lived
societies. It is not possible to grant a universal protection from interference
to individuals, even in cases where nobody else is a¤ected.
This insight is robust and the basic structure of the above argument can
be extended in various directions. The impossibility result, for example, does
not crucially depend on the existence of a natural ordering of generations. It
is not di¢ cult to characterise a leximin time-invariant overtaking (Asheim
et al., 2010; Denition 4, p. 529) by reformulating the anonymity, Pareto,
and minimal completeness axioms as well as the Harm Principle on nite
subsets of agents independent of a natural ordering, and by replacingWPC
with a time-invariant preference continuity axiom (Asheim et al., 2010; p.
524) that also does not depend on a natural ordering of agents. The dual
characterisation of a leximax time-invariant overtaking is similarly obtained
based on a time-invarant version of the Individual Benet Principle and an
impossibility result analogous to Theorem 3 immediately ensues.4
4The proofs of these claims are straightforward modications of the results in Asheim
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Further, in a recent paper, Alcantud (2011) proves that various impossi-
bility results for liberal principles emerge if one focuses on standard axioms
of upper, or lower, semicontinuity in the sup topology, instead of WPC.
It is indeed well-known that continuity requirements in the evaluation of
innite utility streams tend to produce impossibility results (see, e.g., the
classic paper by Diamond, 1965; for a thorough general analysis, see Hara
et al., 2008). It is therefore interesting to develop the analysis of liberal
principles of non-interference without imposing any continuity requirements.
This is the task of the next section.
5 Liberal Principles Reconsidered
This section analyses liberal principles of non-interference in the framework
proposed by Bossert et al. (2007). To this end, additional notation is needed.
For each T 2 N, let XT denote the set of utility streams of X truncated
at T . The leximax swo on XT is denoted by <LXT . Then, 81uT ; 1vT 2 XT ,
the asymmetric factor LXT of <LXT is dened by:
1uT LXT 1vT , uT > vT or [9t  T : uj = vj (8j  T , with t < j) , and ut > vt],
whereas the symmetric factor LXT of <LXT by:
1uT LXT 1vT , 1uT =  (1vT )9 2 .
The leximax catching-up swr <L on X can be formulated as follows.
Dene a relation <LT X X by letting, for all 1u; 1v 2 X,
1u <LT 1v , 1uT <LXT 1vT and T+1u  T+1v. (1)
The relation <LT is reexive and transitive for all T 2 N. Then the leximax
swr onX is <L=
S
T2N <LT : it is reexive and transitive, but not necessarily
et al. (2010; Section 6.2). The details are available from the authors upon request.
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complete. Moreover, following Bossert et al. (2007; equation (14), p. 586),
it can be shown that <L satises the following property:
81u; 1v 2 X : 9T 2 N such that 1u LT 1v , 1u L 1v. (2)
The next Theorem characterises the set of ordering extensions of <L.5
Theorem 4. < is an ordering extension of <L if and only if < satises FA,
SPO, and IBP.
Proof. ()) The proof that any ordering extension of <L satises FA and
SPO is immediate. We only need to prove that any ordering extension <
of <L satises IBP. Consider any 1u; 1v; 1u0; 1v0 2 X such that 9T  1
1u = (1uT ;T+1 v)  1v, and 1u0, 1v0 are such that, 9i  T , u0i > ui, v0i > vi,
u0j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i. We show that 1u0  1v0 whenever u0i >
v0i. Since <LXT is complete and T+1v = T+1u it cannot be 1vT <LXT 1uT ,
otherwise (1v;1 u) 2<L< which contradicts 1u  1v. Thus, we have that
1uT <LXT 1vT , 1vT 6<LXT 1uT , and T+1v = T+1u, so that (1u;1 v) 2LT by (1).
It follows from (2) that (1u;1 v) 2L. As 1u0 and 1v0 are such that, 9i  T ,
u0i > ui, v
0
i > vi, u
0
j = uj 8j 6= i, v0j = vj 8j 6= i, it can easily be shown, as
in Mariotti and Veneziani (2010), that 1u0T LXT 1v0T whenever u0i > v0i. As
T+1v
0 = T+1u0 and 1u0T LXT 1v0T , it follows from (1) that 1u0 LT 1v0, and
therefore 1u0 L 1v0 by (2). But since < is an ordering extension of <L it
follows that 1u0  1v0.
(() The proof is a straightforward modication of the argument in
Bossert et al. (2007; Theorem 2, p. 587), using the characterisation of
the T -person leximax in Mariotti and Veneziani (2010; Proposition 3).6
Lombardi and Veneziani (2009; Theorem 5) characterise the set of or-
dering extensions of the dual leximin catching-up criterion (Bossert et al.,
5The set of ordering extensions characterised in Theorem 4 is of course non-empty by
Szpilrajns extension theorem.
6For the sake of completeness of the proof, the axioms are independent (see the Ad-
dendum).
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2007; p. 586) using FA, SPO, andHP. Therefore, using a similar argument
as in Theorem 3, it immediately follows:
Theorem 5. There exists no swo on X that satises FA, SPO, and NI.
In other words, an impossibility for liberal principles of non-interference
ensues even without assuming continuity, provided MC is strengthened to
focus on swos.
Theorems 3 and 5 have some interesting theoretical implications. Mar-
iotti and Veneziani (2010) prove that in the nite context any swo that
satises the principle of non-interference and Weak Pareto Optimality must
be dictatorial. Theorems 3 and 5 demonstrate that a general conict be-
tween liberal principles of non-interference and standard axioms of fairness
and e¢ ciency exists also in the innite context. Indeed, the method of proof
adopted in this paper forcefully suggests that the incompatibility between
the axioms is not due to their clashing in peculiar congurations of welfare
levels, but rather to the general tension between two conicting swrs that
are simultaneously implied by the axioms.
In a recent paper, Alcantud (2011) shows that, in the innite context, the
conict can be mitigated, and possibility results for liberal, non-interfering
swos do emerge, either if SPO is weakened to Weak Pareto Optimality and
Monotonicity, and FA is dropped (Alcantud, 2011; Theorem 1),7 or if FA
is upheld at the cost of a further reduction in sensitivity to the welfare of
generations by restricting Weak Pareto Optimality to hold only for vectors
that become eventually constant (Alcantud, 2011; Remark 2). This suggests
that Theorem 5 above and Theorem 1 in Alcantud (2011) can be interpreted
as identifying the boundaries of possibility and impossibility results for lib-
eral, non-interfering approaches to intergenerational justice in the innite
context.
7Equity concerns can be captured by axioms imposing Non-dictatorship of the Present
and Non-dictatorship of the Future (Alcantud, 2011; p. 6).
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Conclusions
This paper analyses liberal axioms for swrs in innitely-lived economies.
Various leximax swrs are characterised by appealing to the Individual Ben-
et Principle, which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society.
This result is interesting per se, since the IBP has no obvious inegalitarian
content, and because it provides the rst characterisations of the leximax
in innitely-lived economies. It also has relevant implications for liberal
approaches to social choice. For it allows us to show that there exists a gen-
eral tension between standard fairness and e¢ ciency axioms, such as Finite
Anonymity and Strong Pareto, and a liberal principle of Non-Interference
that generalises IBP.
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6 Addendum to "Liberal Principles for Social Wel-
fare Relations in Innitely-Lived Societies"
6.1 Independence of the axioms in Theorem 2
For an example violating only FA, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X,
1u = 1v ) 1u  1v
9T 2 N : ut = vt 8t < T and uT > vT ) 1u  1v
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximax swr <LX . The swr <
on X satises all axioms except FA.
For an example violating only SPO, dene < on X in the following way:
81u; 1v 2 X, 1u  1v. The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximax
swr <LX . Clearly, the swr < on X satises all axioms except SPO.
For an example violating only IBP, let < on X be the leximin swr (see
Denition 1, p. 3). It follows that the swr < on X is not an extension of
the leximax swr. The swr < on X satises all axioms except IBP.
For an example violating only MC, dene < on X in the following way:
81u,1v 2 X,
9 2  : 1u =  (1v) ) 1u s 1v;
1u > 1v ) 1u  1v.
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximax swr. The swr < on
X satises all axioms except MC.
For an example violating onlyWPC, let < onX be the leximax catching
up dened in Section 5 above. It follows that the swr < on X is not an
extension of the leximax swr. The swr < on X satises all axioms except
WPC. [To see thatWPC is violated let con denote the stream of constant
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level of well-being equal to  2 R. Consider the following vectors: 1u =
(3; con0) and 1v = (2; con1). Then, (1u; 1 v) 62< and ((1uT ; T+1 v) ;1 v) 2LT
8T 2 N].
6.2 Independence of the axioms in Theorem 4
The proof that the axioms in Theorem 4 are tight immediately follows from
the previous examples and from the characterisation of the set of ordering
extensions of the leximin catching-up in Lombardi and Veneziani (2009,
Theorem 5).
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